88 / 2021-09-27 09:10:19

Evolutionary Game and Simulation Study on Emergency Synergy of China's coal mines

coal mine accident; emergency coordination; evolutionary game; simulation analysis

A large number of people and departments are involved in the cooperative work of coal mine accident emergency, but there will inevitably be some conflicts and cooperation in the cooperative action because they have different cognitive structures, preferences and interest motives. Therefore, the analysis of the game relationship between the conflict and cooperation among the cooperative subjects is beneficial for the emergency managers to make correct decisions in the conflict environment. In this paper, the evolutionary game theory is used to construct the behavioral game model between local government and coal mine enterprises in the collaborative work of coal mine accident emergency, and numerical simulation analysis is carried out to analyze the influencing factors of their decision behavior, thus providing policy suggestions for the collaborative decision-making of coal mine accident emergency. The results of evolutionary game and simulation analysis show that the establishment of information sharing mechanism between local government and coal mining enterprises is beneficial for local government to positively integrate coal mine accident emergency response when necessary. Emergency response cost is the key factor affecting the emergency response efforts of coal mining enterprises. When local governments formulate relevant policies for emergency coordination in future practice, they should focus on how to establish compensation mechanism and incentive mechanism for emergency response cost. Only in this way can the enthusiasm and efforts of emergency coordination of coal mining enterprises be better improved.