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Game-theoretic Model of Day-ahead Electricity Market Considering Penalties for Retailers’ Bid Deviations
编号：424 访问权限：仅限参会人 更新：2022-05-21 15:56:42 浏览：112次 张贴报告

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摘要
Due to the uncertainty in consumers’ forecasted demand, it is inevitable that there exist deviations between retailers’ bidding demand in the day-ahead wholesale market and their actual demand, which will be penalized by the market operator. In order to investigate the impacts of the deviation penalty mechanism on retailers’ bidding strategies, a game-theoretic model of the day-ahead wholesale market considering retailers’ bid deviation penalty mechanism is proposed. In this model, it is considered that retailers strategically bid their load demand and generators strategically offer their supply functions. In addition, retailers have to pay penalties for their over-bidding and under-bidding deviations with different penalty prices. A scenario reduction technique is employed to describe the uncertainties of retailers’ actual demand. This model is solved using the nonlinear complementarity method. Numerical examples show that the deviation penalty mechanism can effectively induce retailers to reduce their bid deviations. This study will help the market operator to mitigate the retailers’ bid deviations by means of  appropriate penalty prices.
关键词
day-ahead wholesale electricity market; retailer; bid deviation; deviation penalty mechanism; game model
报告人
XunXie
Master student 上海大学

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重要日期

  • 会议日期

    05月27日

    2022

    至

    05月29日

    2022

  • 02月28日 2022

    初稿截稿日期

  • 05月29日 2022

    注册截止日期

  • 06月22日 2022

    报告提交截止日期

主办单位
IEEE Beijing Section
China Electrotechnical Society
Southeast University
协办单位
IEEE Industry Applications Society
IEEE Nanjing Section
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