Game analysis of logistics park green improvement under the role of government
编号:1045 访问权限:仅限参会人 更新:2021-12-03 10:35:01 浏览:104次 张贴报告

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摘要
Facing the rapid rise of the logistics park and the ecological problems that follow, it is imperative for the logistics enterprises in the park to carry out ecological rectification. In order to clarify the strategic choices and influencing factors of local governments, logistics parks and logistics enterprises in the green promotion. According to the dynamic game under incomplete information, the game model of the three is established, and the obtained equilibrium solution is analyzed. The results show that the three strategies and the selection probabilities interact with each other, and the government has the responsibility of guiding and supervising, while the logistics park, as the intermediary, accepts the supervision of the government as an intermediary and has the responsibility of supervising the enterprise. The supervision of the two is the external driving force for the improvement of logistics enterprises, and the improvement effect of logistics enterprises also acts on local governments and logistics parks. Finally, suggestions were made for the green development of local governments, logistics parks and logistics companies.
关键词
CICTP
报告人
Huirong Wang
Chang 'an University

稿件作者
Huirong Wang Chang 'an University
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重要日期
  • 会议日期

    12月17日

    2021

    12月20日

    2021

  • 12月16日 2021

    报告提交截止日期

  • 12月24日 2021

    注册截止日期

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Chinese Overseas Transportation Association
Chang'an University
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