This study examines integrated security control and communication co-design for industrial cyber-physical systems (ICPS) under concurrent progressive stealthy false data injection (PS-FDI) attacks and actuator faults via a distributed adaptive discrete event-triggered communication scheme (D-ADETCS), integrating data-driven and model-based analytical approaches. Firstly, by comprehensively considering the stealthiness, effectiveness, and target selectivity of FDI, a novel FDI attack model with progressive target-selecting capability has been established. Secondly, by incorporating an event-triggered mechanism at the front of the actuation-side network, a D-ADETCS framework has been established to alleviate data transmission congestion in dual-end communication networks. Additionally, a GCRA-RF attack reconstruction-prediction model has been developed through data-driven approaches to achieve restoration of system data corrupted by PS-FDI. By designing corresponding robust control units, simultaneous integration of passive intrusion tolerance against cyber-attacks and active fault tolerance for actuator faults has been achieved. Then, by means of less conservative techniques such as augmented Lyapunov-Krasovskii functional and improved affine Bessel-Legendre inequality to derive robust observer and integrated safety controller；Finally, experimental validation on a quadruple-tank system confirms the methodology's effectiveness.